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Abstract
Applies an AI theory of learning, called explanation- 
based learning, to infant learning to explain one way in 
which infants learn about the physical world. Two 
experiments examined 12-month-old infants ability to observe 
an event and distinguish between relevant and irrelevant 
modifications of the event. In Experiment 1, infants saw a 
rod being pushed through a block with a hole in it. Then 
they saw two modifications- one possible, with a plastic red 
very different in appearance from the original rod, but 
having the same diameter, and one impossible, with a fat rod 
that was identical to the original rod except that it was 
three times larger in diameter. The older 12-month-old 
infants looked reliably longer at the impossible than at the 
possible event, suggesting that they understood that for a 
rod to fit through a hole, the rod*s diameter cannot be 
larger than the size of the hole. Experiment 2 was identical 
to Experiment 1 except that the infants were never shown the 
size ot the hole in the block, as the infants in Experiment l 
were, and therefore both modifications to the event were 
possible. These infants looked reliably longer at the event 
with the plastic rod than at the event with the fat rod. 
Together, the results of Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 
indicated that the infants, after observing an initial event, 
were able to make predictions for future events.
ha adults, we live in a world about which we hold many 
beliefs* We have countless assumptions about how objects 
should behave in the world* This makes our environment very 
predictable. We know that if we put our coat in the closet, 
it will remain there until someone removes it. We know that 
if we drop a glass on a hard surface, it will probably break. 
Where do these beliefs come from, and how long have we had 
them? At what age do infants begin to share our knowledge 
about the physical properties of objects, and how do they 
acquire it? The present research addresses this question of 
infant learning.
Piaget’s (1954) ideas about learning, or the specific 
development of infants’ beliefs, have shaped the direction of 
research in the area of infant cognition since the early 
19501s • He held that infants are born with absolutely no 
knowledge about the physical w^rld. Recognizing that infants 
are very active, he asserted that it is through action that 
infants construct knowledge about objects. In other words, 
their actions are their ’’origins of intelligence.” According 
to Piaget, infants from the time of birth begin to structure 
their world through interactions with the environment. This 
structuring evolves in a systematic way that is basically the 
same for all infants. Thus, all infants pass through the 
same stages of cognitive development. This development, 
resulting from action, is not surprisingly tied very closely
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to sensorimotor development.
Until recent years, Piaget's constructivist theory of 
infant learning was widely accepted. However, in light of 
recent research which challenges Piaget*s theory, it is now 
believed that infants have a much more sophisticated view of 
the physical world than was presumed.
One challenge has addressed Piaget’s assertion that 
infants do not represent the existence of hidden objects 
until 9 months of age. Piaget based his conclusion on the 
fact that it is only at this age that infants begin to search 
for fully occluded objects. Today, many researchers use 
measures of infants' looking behavior instead of search tasks 
to investigate whether infants understand that objects 
continue to exist when hidden. Using measures of habituation 
of looking, Baillargeon (1987) found evidence of object 
permanence in some infants as young as 3.5-months-old. The
3.5- and 4.5-month-old infants in this study were habituated 
to a screen that rotated back and forth through a 180-degree 
arc in the manner of a drawbridge. Following habituation, a 
box was placed behind the screen and the infants saw two test 
events: a possible and an impossible event. In the possible 
event, the screen rotated until it reached the occluded box, 
stopped there, and then returned to its original position? in 
the impossible event, the screen rotated until it reached the 
occluded box and then continued as though the box was no
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longer behind it. The screen rotated through the whole 180- 
degree arc before reversing direction and returning to its 
initial position, revealing the box standing intact in the 
same location as before. The 4.5-month-old infants, and the
3.5- month-old infants who were fast habituators, looked 
reliably longer at the impossible than at the possible test 
event. This suggests that they (a) believed that the box 
continued to exist after it was occluded by the screen; (b) 
understood that the screen could not rotate through the space 
occupied by the box; and hence (c) expected the screen to 
stop when it reached the box and were surprised that it 
failed to do so.
Infants* knowledge about adequate and inadequate support 
has also been examined by Baillargeon and Hanko-Summers 
(1990). In one experiment, infants between 7.5-months and
9.5- months of age were shown a small box that was centered 
between and supported by two larger boxes. Neither of these 
boxed alone provided adequate support for the small box.
Prior to the experiment, the infants were shown that the 
small box was either attached to or separate from the left 
box. All infants were shown the same test event: the right 
box was moved to the right so that the small box was now 
supported only by the left box. The infants who saw the 
small box as separate from the left box looked reliably 
longer than the other infants at the test event, suggesting
that they realized that the left box alone did not provide 
adequate support for the small box, and were therefore 
surprised that the small box did not fall during the test 
event.
Considering yet another aspect of object behavior,
Speike and Kestenbaum (1986) presented evidence suggesting 
that infants at 4 months of age have some understanding of 
spatiotemporal continuity. That is, they expect objects to 
move continuously through space and over time.
Is it possible, then, to say that young infants have no 
concept or knowledge of objects? Most research today 
suggests it is not. The physical world perceived by the 
infant appears to be much more sophisticated than was 
believed by Piaget.
Given that infants demonstrate knowledge of physical 
properties well before they manipulate objects, the question 
becomes one of how they acquire this knowledge. Where does 
this knowledge come from?
Spelke (in press) asserts that infants are born with a 
very rich, sophisticated conception of the physical world 
which guides their behavior. According to this view, infants 
are born with an innate understanding of objects and of seme 
of their physical and spatial properties. Spelke draws 
support for this position from recent research, as was 
mentioned earlier, which suggests that Piaget(s theory is not
completely accurate in specifying the knowledge infants hold 
at certain ages. Infants, according to Spelke, are endowed 
with an initial object concept. More specifically, infants 
enter the world with a concept of objects as "cohesive, 
bounded, substantial, and spatiotemporaliy continuous." The 
object concept "is present, albeit in impoverished form, near 
the beginning of life....[and] reveals itself through the way 
infants organize and make sense of the world they perceive" 
(Spelke, in press). This object concept, contrary to 
Piaget's theory, does not depend on the development of 
sensorimotor activity.
Alternatively, Baillargeon (1987) has proposed that 
perhaps infants are born with powerful learning mechanisms 
which allows them to learn in a variety of ways through 
observing the world around them. These ways could include 
analogy-based learning and similarity-based learning, as well 
as the type of learning specifically addressed in the present 
research which is called explanation-based learning. 
Explanation-based learning (EBL) is a term borrowed from the 
field of artificial intelligence (AI) (DeJcng, in 
preparation). It has not previously been applied to infant 
learning. This could be partially due to the fact that EBL 
is a relatively young concept in the realm of artificial 
intelligence itself, and is the object of much research in 
the field* It can be viewed as a type of "learning from
observation” which allows a system to analyze a few specific 
episodes, build explanations, and through this obtain general 
knowledge. Background knowledge is very important in this 
process. In AI, the important feature of this model is the 
way in which the system uses an explanation built from a few 
examples: through understanding how or why t*he specific 
examples work, it then generalizes that specj: ■ * information 
to other problems with similar properties (e.g. it (joes from 
specific to general knowledge). This differentiates it from, 
for examp1e, similarity-based learning which requires the 
consideration of many examples and very little background 
knowledge (i.e. applies genera* knowledge gained from many 
examples to address a specific problem). In EBL, by using 
only a few examples, the system "defines the boundaries of a 
concept” in what we call an explanation. This concept 
definition, or explanation, is determined by speculation 
guided by background knowledge of why the example worked, rot 
by similarities and differences between the present example 
and previous instances, as is the case in similarity-based 
learning. Then the system can use the explanation it has 
built by generalizing it to solve other similar problems 
(DeJong, in press).
When applied to infant learning, the concept remains much 
the same. The theory asserts that when infants observe an 
event in the physical world (e.g. a green, wooden stick
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pushing a red ball, causing it to roll) they build some type 
of explanation for it, using their background knowledge.
This explanation may or may not be correct. A correct 
explanation would be one in which the infant identifies the 
properties of the event or objects which are important or 
relevant to the specific task at hand (e.g. the stick 
impacting the ball). if infants build correct explanations 
for events which they observe, then they should be able to 
generalize this information and make correct predictions 
about how the objects should behave in future events. In 
particular, they should be able to differentiate between a 
relevant modification (e.g. the stick being pushed, but 
stopping a few inches before hitting the ball) and an 
irrelevant modification (e.g. changing the color or texture 
of the stick) of the event. If one of the objects is 
transformed in a way that should disrupt the event shown to 
the infant (e.g. the stick not touching the ball) , then the 
infant who has built a correct explanation for this event 
should predict this disruption. If this disruption does not 
occur, the infant will probably be surprised.
A concrete example and evidence for this type of 
learning in children can be drawn from a study devised by 
Baillargeon, Gelman, and Meek (in preparation) to test causal 
reasoning in 3- and 4-year olds. The children were shown a 
causal event as follows: a rod was pushed through a pest and
9
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hit the first of 5 standing blocks? each block fell on the 
block next to it in a domino-like fashion and the fifth block 
fell on a small lever, causing a toy rabbit to jump into a 
small bed. The children were then asked about relevant and 
irrelevant modifications to the sequence, but the sequence 
was not performed for them using the modifications. An 
example of a relevant modification was showing them a rod too 
short to reach the first block. An example of an irrelevant 
modification was using a rod that was a different color.
When asked to predict whether these modifications would 
affect the outcome, the rabbit falling, all the children were 
reliably able to predict which modifications were relevant 
and which were irrelevant. These findings provide a good 
illustration and lend excellent support to the theory of 
explanation-based learning. The children in the experiment 
observed an event, a causal sequence. They were subsequently 
able to make correct predictions about modifications of the 
sequence, indicating that they had built a correct cognitive 
explanation of the event. They were able to use the specific 
information they observed, identify relevant variables, and 
generalize these explanations to novel situations, all the 
components of EBL. Does this type of learning exist in 
infants as well?
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Experiment 1
In the present experiment, 12-month-old infants were 
first habituated to an event in which a wooden rod was pushed 
through a wooden block with a hole running through it; the 
rod had the same diameter as the hole in the block.
Following this habituation phase, the infants were shown 2 
modifications of the original event, in which different rods 
were used. In one modification, the new rod was almost 
identical to rod in the original event (e.g. same color, 
length, texture) but its diameter was three times Jirger than 
the diameter of the original rod, making it much too large to 
fit through hole in the block. However, during this event, 
the new rod "magically" fits through the block. In the other 
modification, the new rod is very different in appearance 
from the original rod; it is longer and made of clear 
plastic. However, the relevant variable, the diameter, is 
the same as that of the original rod. This experiment
was designed to test the explanation-based learning theory. 
According to the theory, the infants would build an 
explanation for the original event during the habituation 
phase, and would then be able to generalize this knowledge to 
make predictions about the subsequent modifications to the 
event. Our predictions are as follows: if the infants built 
a correct explanation for the original event (e.g. one in 
which they identified the rod diameter as the relevant
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variable), then they would (a) expect the event to be 
disrupted when the fat rod was used, but not when the plastic 
rod was used, and (b) indicate surprise when the fat rod does 
not disrupt the event by looking longer at this event than at 
the event using the plastic rod.
Subjects
Subjects were 32 full-term infants ranging in age from 
11 months, 28 days, to 13 months, 3 days (M= 12 months, 19 
days). Four additional infants were eliminated from the 
experiment! 1 because of procedural error, 2 because of 
fussiness, and 1 because of equipment failure. The infants* 
names were obtained from the birth announcements in a local 
newspaper. Parents were contacted by letters and follow-up 
phone calls. They were offered reimbursement for their 
travel expenses but were not compensated for their 
participation.
The apparatus consisted of a large wooden box, 
resembling a puppet theater, which was 182 cm high, 103 cm 
wide, and 61 cm deep. The infants faced a large opening 33 
cm high and 93 cm wide in the front wall of the apparatus. 
The floor of the apparatus was pale blue; the back wall was 
white decorated with pastel colors; the sides were white 
decorated with thin primary color stripes.
The objects used in the* events included a metal stand, 
two rectangular wooden bi cks, two wooden rods, and a plastic 
rod.
The metal stand consisted of a horizontal metal square, 
7.5 x 7.5 cm with a 5 x 5 cm hole at its center, made of a 
flat sheet of metal. From the middle of the left and right 
sides of the square protruded a 1.75 cm screw. Beneath the 
square was attached a 3 cm skirt made of green material.
This metal square was affixed at the top of a vertical metal 
rectangle 1^.5 cm high, 7.5 cm wide, and .01 cm thick. The 
vertical metal rectangle was covered with bright red contact 
paper. This entire fixture was mounted on another piece of 
flat metal which lay on the ground and was hidden by the 
stand, and a weight was placed on this piece of metal to hold 
the stand firmly in place.
The two rectangular wooden blocks were identical in 
every aspect except for the size of the hole in each block. 
The blocks were 7.5 cm wide, 7.5 cm deep, and 12.5 cm high. 
They were painted bright yellow with a thin hot-pink stripe 
around the top and bottom. Each block also had a hole 
running through the longest dimension. In one block, the 
hole was 1.3 cm wide, and was outlined by a thin stripe of 
green paint; in the other block, the hole was 3.2 cm wide. 
Each block also had 4 small holes, 2 on the bottom and 2 on 
the back, to help secure the block on the stand.
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The two wooden rods were identical except for the size 
of their ameter. They were both 30,77 cm long and painted 
deep blue. One rod, which we will refer to as the 
habituation rod, had a diameter of .97 cm; the other, which 
we will refer to as the fat rod, had a diameter of 2.9 cm.
The plastic rod was made of clear plexiglass. It was 
39.7 cm long and .97 cm in diameter.
The lights of the room in which the infants were tested 
were off during the experiment, and the stage was brightly 
lit by four clip-on lights (each with a 40-W lightbulb) 
attached to the back and side walls of the apparatus. This 
was done to keep the infants* attention focused on the stage 
only. Two wooden frames, each 182 cm high and 71 cm wide and 
covered with blue cloth, stood at an angle on either side of 
the apparatus. These frames isolated the infants from the 
experimental room. A muslin-covered frame 61 cm high and 100 
cm wide, used as a curtain, was lowered in front of the 
opening in the front of the apparatus at the end of each 
trial.
Events
Experimenter 1 (El) manipulated the objects on the floor 
of the apparatus to produce the experimental events, while 
Experimenter 2 raised and lowered the curtain between trials. 
To help El perform the event at a consistent rate, a 
metronome beat softly once per second. As the events are
described below, the number of seconds taken to perform each 
part of the event is listed in parentheses after the 
description of the action.
Block-Down Habituation Event. At the start of this 
event, the metal stand stood in the center of the apparatus 
floor, 26 cm from the lack wail of the apparatus and 40 cm 
from the infant. Th> olock with the small hole lay to the 
right of the stand with the hole facing the infant; the 
habituation rod lay to the right of the block. El, wearing a 
bright blue glove, lifted the block into the air and held it, 
with the hole facing the infant, at the infant’s eye level 
(see Figure 1). After the infant had looked at the block for 
4 cumulative seconds, El placed the block on the stand (2 s) 
horizontally so the hole was still visible to the baby (the 
screws on the stand fit into the small holes on the bottom of 
the block so that the block was secured in place). Next, El 
picked up the habituation rod (1 s), rotated it in the a i r 
next to the block horizontally and vertically (4 s), moved it 
to the hole at the back of the block (2 s), pushed and pulled 
the rod through the block (4 s), and finally took the rod out 
of the block and returned it to its original position on the 
floor of the apparatus and rested there (3 s). El repeated 
this 16 s cycle until the computer signaled that the trial 
had ended (see below).
Block-Up Habituation Event. This event was identical to 
the block-down habituation event, except that El placed the 
block on the stand vertically instead of horizontally. In 
this case, the infant only saw the hole at the very beginning 
of the each trial, before the beginning of the 16 s cycle of 
action, but not during the cycle, because when the block was 
placed vertically on the stand, the top of the block was too 
high for the infant to see. As the rod was pushed through 
the block, the infant could not see it come through the hol« 
in the bottom because this was hidden by the green skirt 
attached to the square portion of the stand (they did see the 
rod appear below the skirt, but were unable to see the hole). 
(see Figure 1)
Possible Test Event. At the start of the possible test 
event, the block with the small hole stood vertically on the 
stand; the infant could not see the hole from the top or 
bottom. Laying side by side on the floor of the apparatus to 
the right of the stand were the habituation rod and the 
plastic rod. El tapped the plastic rod lightly on the floor 
of the apparatus until the infant had looked at the rods for 
4 cumulative seconds. Next, El lifted the plastic rod and 
rotated it horizontally and vertically next to the block (4 
s), moved the plastic rod to the hole at the top of the block 
(2 s) , pushed and pulled the plastic rod through the block (4 
s), and finally took the rod out of the blocx and placed it
back in its original position next to the habituation rod (3 
s). The motions in this 13 s cycle were identical to the 
motions in the habituation event (after the point when El 
placed the block on the stand and reached for the habituation 
rod), and the cycle was repeated until the trial had ended.
Impossible Test Evc*nt. This event was identical to the 
possible test event except for the following: (a) the block 
with the large hole was used instead of the block with the 
small hole, although to the infant, who couldn't see tne 
hole, this block appeared identical to the block used in the 
possible test event (they were not given any information 
which would lead them to believe that this was a different 
block); and (b) the fat rod was used in place of the plastic 
rod. Although this fat rod was much too large to fit through 
the small hole, and therefore should have disrupted the 
event, the event proceeded with no disruption. To adults,
s would seem to be impossible
i x s m M m
Prior to the experiment, each infant was allowed to 
manipulate the 3 rods, the metal stand, and the wooden block 
with the small hole (the infant was never shown the block 
with the large hole) while his or her parent filled out some 
consent forms. During the experiment, the infant sat on the 
parent's lap in front of the apparatus. The parent was asked 
not to interact with the infant during the test trials. At
a ii l l i i i i i l i t e Illllilli
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the start of the test trials, the parent was instructed to 
close his or her eyes so as not to influence the infant's 
reactions to the event.
The infant's looking behavior was monitored by two 
trained observers who watched the infant through peepholes in 
the cloth-covered frames on either side of the apparatus.
The observers could not see the experimental events, and they 
did not know the order which the test events were 
presented. Each observer held a button linked to a 
MICRO/PDP-11 computer and depressed the button when the 
infants attended to the experimental events. Interobserver 
agreement was calculated for each trial on the basis on the 
number of seconds for which the observers agreed on the 
direction of the infant's gaze out of the total number of 
seconds the trial lasted. Disagreements of less than 0.1 
seconds were ignored. Agreement in this experiment averaged 
93% per trial per infant. The looking times recorded by the 
primary observer were used to determine when the trial had 
ended.
At the beginning of the experiment, all the infants saw 
four habituation trials: two trials of the block-up 
habituation event alternated with two trials of the block- 
down habituation event. Then each infant was shown three 
ptirs of test trials, each pair consisting of one possible 
and one Impossible test event. Half of the infants were
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shown the impossible event as the first event in each pair, 
and the other half saw the possible event as the first event 
in each pair. Each habituation and test trial ended when the 
infant either (a) looked away from the event for 2 
consecutive seconds liter having looked at it for at least 10 
seconds, or (b) looked at the event for 60 cumulative 
seconds. Thirty of the 32 infants completed three pairs of 
test events. One infant only completed two pairs of test 
events because of fussiness, and for another infant, the 
third pair of test events was eliminated because of low 
interobserver agreement.
Besults
The infants looking times during the test phase of the 
experiment were compared by means of a 2 x 2  x 3 mixed model 
analysis of variance with Order (impossible or possible event 
first) as the between-subjects factor and with Event 
(impossible or possible event) and Pair (first, second, or 
third pair of test trials) as the within-subjects factors.
The analysis showed no significant difference in the infants* 
looking times at the impossible than at the possible test 
events, F(1,151) * .12. However, it appeared that the older 
infants in the sample tested tended to look longer at the 
impossible than at the possible event, whereas the younger 
infants tended to look equally at the two events. To test 
this, Age was added as a between-subjects factor to our
model. We divided infants into two groups: Younger (11 
months, 28 days to 12 months,15 days) and Older (12 months,
16 days to 13 months, 3 days). This ANOVA revealed a 
significant Age x Pair x Event interaction, F(2,41) - 3.14, p 
< .05, indicating that the two age groups showed 
significantly different patterns of looking at the three 
pairs of impossible and possible test events (see Figure 2). 
Planned comparisons showed that on the first test pair, the 
older infants looked reliably longer at the impossible 
(M=43.4 s) than at the possible (M=32.4 s) event, F(l,146) - 
5.56, p<.05, whereas the younger infants looked equally at 
the impossible (M=34.8 s) and the possible ({4^39.8 s) events, 
F(l,146) * 1.15, p > .05. On the second and third test 
pairs, both the older on the younger infants looked about 
equally at the impossible and the possible test events, all 
F's < 0.98.
Discussion
The older 12-month-old infants looked reliably longer at 
the impossible than at the possible test event on the first 
pair of events. This suggests that they (a) identified rod- 
diameter as the relevant variable for the event, (b) 
predicted that the fat rod should not fit through the block, 
and hence (c) were surprised when the fat rod did go through 
the block. This is especially interesting because the 
plastic rod (with the irrelevant modifications) was
20
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perceptually very different from the habituation rod and was 
therefore more novel than the fat rod, yet even though 
infants tend to look longer at perceptually novel objects, 
the older infants still looked much longer at the fat rod 
event, which was impossible. The novel appearance of the 
plastic rod could explain partially why a reliable difference 
in looking time is not shown in the second and third pairs of 
test events for the older infants. This will be discussed in 
Discussion of Experiment 2.
One difficulty with the design of Experiment 1 was that 
the infants could have looked longer at the impossible event 
simply because they preferred the fat rod to the plastic rod. 
Therefore, a control experiment (Experiment 2) was conducted 
in which infants were not given the information which would 
enable them to discriminate between the relevant and 
irrelevant modifications of the event (i.e. they were never 
shown the size of the hole in the block). If the looking 
patterns were similar to those in Experiment 1, then a simple 
preference for the fat rod would be the most parsimonious 
explanation for the results presented. However, if the 
looking patterns differed from those in Experiment 1, it 
could be taken as an indication that the infants in 
Experiment 1 used the information from the habituation phase 
to make predictions, and that their looking patterns were not 
simply due to a preference for the fat rod over the plastic
22
rod.
Experiment 2
Experiment 1 showed that the older 12-month-old infants 
looked reliably longer on the first pair of test events at 
the impossible event (fat rod) than at the possible event 
(plastic rod). Experiment 2 was designed to find out whether 
the infants simply preferred the fat rod over the plastic rod 
without understanding the impossibility of the fat rod 
fitting through the block.
This experiment was identical to Experiment 1 except 
that the infants were never shown the size of the hole in the 
block. Without this information, both test events could be 
possible, because the hole could be any size. Therefore, if 
the infants in this condition still showed a preference for 
the event with the fat rod, then it would not be possible to 
take this preference as an indication of surprise at the 
event in Experiment 1. However, because the experiment was 
identical in every other way, if these infants showed no 
preference for the event with the fat rod, it would be 
reasonable to suggest that in Experiment 1, the infants did 
use the information about the hole size and predicted that 
the plastic rod but not the fat rod could be pushed through 
the block.
Subjects
Subjects were 11 healthy, full-term infants ranging in 
age from 12 months, 17 days to 13 months, 4 days (M - 12 
months, 25 days). Three additional subjects were 
eliminated, two because of adverse conditions in the 
experimental room, and one because of procedural error. 
Apparatus
The apparatus was identical to the apparatus in 
Experiment 1.
EVMLtff
All four habituation trials were identical to the block-
up habituation events in Experiment 1, except that at the
beginning of each trial, El held the block vertically
(instead of horizontally) in the air so that the hole could
not be seen by the infant. The rest of each trial proceeded
♦Vexactly like the block-down habituation events in Experiment
1.
In Experiment 2 there were two test events, a plastic-rod 
event and a fat-rod event, identical to the possible and 
impossible events in Experiment 1 respectively. Notice that 
although these test events used the exact same modifications 
as the test events in Experiment 1, neither modification 
would necessarily disrupt the event. For ease in comparing 
the two experiments, we will refer to the test events in
Experiment 2 as possible (instead of plastic-rod event) and 
impossible (instead of fat-rod event) test events, although 
both events were actually possible.
REQggdliEf
Prior to the experiment, all the infants were allowed to 
manipulate the three rods and the stand. They were not shown 
the wooden block. The procedure followed was exactly the 
same as in Experiment 1. Interobserver reliability averaged 
95% per trial per infant.
Results
Figure 3 shows the mean looking times at the impossible 
and possible events of the older 12-month-old infants in 
Experiment 1 and of the infants in Experiment 2 (control 
condition). The looking times of the infants in Experiment 2 
were analyzed by means of a 2 x 2 x 3 mixed model analysis of 
variance with Order (impossible or possible event first) as 
the between-subjects factor and with Event (impossible or 
possible) as the between-subjects factor and Pair (first, 
second, or third pair of test events) as the within-subjects 
factors. The results showed a significant effect of Event, 
F(l,50) * 4.83, p < .05, indicating that the infants looked 
reliably longer at the possible (H=35.7 s) than at the 
impossible (H*29.9 s) event.
24
Discussion
The results of Experiment 2 indicated that the infants 
had a reliable preference for the possible event (i.e. the 
plastic rod). This is consistent with two interpretations: 
(1) the plastic rod in the test event was perceptually more 
novel to the infants, and therefore, consistent with evidence 
that infants look longer at novel objects or events, they 
looked longer at this event; or (2) the ini ants had an 
intrinsic preference for the plastic rod over the fat rod. 
Either way, the absence of a preference for the fat rod 
provides evidence that the older 12-rnonth-olds in Experiment 
1 looked longer at the impossible than at the possible event 
not because they preferred the tat rod, but because they 
believed that the fat rod was too large to fit through the 
hole, and were surprised when it did. Why, then, did the 
infants in Experiment 1 show a preference for the impossible 
event on only the first pair test events? One possibility, 
supported by the results of Experiment 2, is that there were 
two opposing tendencies, one for the event with the fat rod 
which was impossible, and one for the plastic rod which was 
more novel. Another possible explanation is that the infants 
were initially surprised at the impossibility of the event 
with the fat rod, but built some type of explanation for it 
and quickly lost interest. For example, they may have 
decided that there must be two blocks, one with a very large 
hole, and therefore the fat rod was able to fit through. If
they built this explanation during the first pair of test 
events, then the impossible event would have lost its 
•'magic", so to speak, and it would be understandable that the 
infants lost interest.
Conclusions
The combined results of Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 
provide firm evidence for explanation-based learning in 12- 
month-old infants. The information given to the infants in 
Experiment 1 about the size of the hole in the block seemed 
to affect their interpretation of subsequent similar events 
(the test events). We suggest that they build some type of 
cognitive explanation for the event in which they identified 
the important variables, and were thus able to make 
predictions about future events. When the experimental 
manipulation violated these predictions, they looked longer, 
indicating surprise. If infants do have the capacity to 
build explanations from observing events, then this supports 
the assertion mentioned earlier by Baillargeon (1987) that 
infants are born with powerful learning mechanisms which 
allow them to learn in a variety of ways. Explanation-based 
learning may be one of those ways. In order to confirm this 
hypothesis (that infants are born with this ability to learn 
through building explanations), evidence for this type of 
learning must be found in much younger infants. Research 
such as this is currently underway.
2 (j
How do infants learn about the physical world?
Possibly, as Piaget (1954) asserted, they learn some things 
by manipulating objects in the world. But this clearly does 
not give us the whole picture. Perhaps, as Spelkc (in press) 
suggests, they arc born with some initial object concept.
But clearly this concept changes and becomes more 
sophisticated over time. Explanation-based learning may help 
us to understand the changes in infants* perceptions of the 
physical world and give us a clearer view of infant 
development.
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Figure Captions
Figure 1. Schematic drawing of the habituation and test 
events shown to the infants in Experiment 1.
Figure 2. Mean looking times of the infants in Experiment 1 
at the possible and impossible test events after they had 
been divided into two age groups, Young and Old.
Figure 3. Mean looking times of just the older 12-month-old 
infants from Experiment 1 and all the infants (also older 12- 
month olds) from Experiment 2 at the Plastic Rod Event 
(possible for both groups) and the Fat Rod Event (impossible 
in Experiment 1 but possible in Experiment 2).
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